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Is the online auction an efficient mechanism for pricing
initial public offerings (IPOs)? Its intent was to mini-
mize first day price surges in IPOs, which represented
"motley left on the table" for bsuers. Evidence from
(ri>ogle's IPO suggests that the online auction process
may not have minimized thefiirst day price surge, since
82 percent of the IPOs issued in 2004 using the tradi-
tional process experienced less of an increase. Further-
more, a comparison of auction IPOs with traditional
IPOs issued in the same year and in the same three-
digit SIC code suggests that 44 percent of the auction
IPOs have greater first day price surges than their tra-
ditional counterparts. A broader comparison of the pric-
ing behavior of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs
presents a mixed picture and sngge.st.s that the size of
underwriter may be an important Jartor. The mispric-
ing that occurs in auctions tnay be due to an informa-
tional asymmetry on the part of small investors. This
informational gap could arise because small investors
lack access to the information sources that institutional
investors have or because companies are not required to
provide detailed information in the online process, inas-
much as they don) undergo the rigorous scrutiny of
investment banks in the traditional bookbuilding process.
This informational gap may be alleviated by the SEC
refortns of the '\piiet period^' atid by the issuer providing
more detailed information on the uses of the funds.
The resurgence in ihe initial public offering(IPO) market in 2004 and 2005 raises ques-tions of whether IPOs issued recently willdevelop pri( ing patterns similar to thoseexhibited by IPOs during the dot.com years
and wliether ahernative IPO issuance processes, such as
the online auction process used by Google, would provide
more efficient pricing. The increase between the offer
price and the open price for newly issued IPOs still
remains a matter of concern, altliough these increases are
not nearly at tbe levels exhibited by IPOs in 1999, when,
for example, Enel, VA Linux, and Sycamore Networks
experienced increases between their offer |)rices and
their open prices of 966.9 percent, 896.7 percent, and
612.H peri-eni, respectively.
Critics of the existing IPO allocation process argue
thai minimizing offer-t(t-open price appreciation is impor-
tant because the preferred clients of the investment
banks, who were initially allocated shares of the IPO
under the traditional pmcess, are the beneficiaries of the
price inf-rease, rather than the issuing company.
Consequently, from the perspective of the issuing compa-
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ny, the increase between the offer price and the open pri< e^
represents "money left on the table." The development of
the Dutch auction process, used in Goof l^e's IPO, repre-
sents one of the most recent of the attempts to efficiently
price IPOs l)y setting a sufficiently accurate offer price
that the offer-lo-open price increase and any substantial,
immediate price appreciation in the absence of news are
minimized. This would result in the issuer receiving pro-
ceeds that are a more accurate reflection of the economic
value of the firm.
In the traditional IPO allocation process., the invest-
ment banks in charge of the IPO take the issue on a "road
show" to various possible investors {often large mutual
funds or preferred clients of the investment bank) and
build a demand curve of possible prices for the new issue
based upon the indications of interest that they receive
from the investors. In return, these investors often receive
the initial allotments of IPO shares partially to (-ompen-
sate them for revealing this pricing information and hence
benefit from the price appreciation imbued in the price
surge on the first day.
As numerous press articles have noted, the Dutch
auction method would in theory minimize or eliminate the
offer-to-open prit^e increase on the IPOs first day by
developing an offer price that is a more accurate reflection
of the company's value.'
Proponenls of the online auction
process argue that the value of the
IPO goes to the company that is
going public, rather than to the
favored clients of the investment
bank.
Under this method, bidders post the price that they
are willing to pay and the number of shares that they wish
to purchase. This generates a demand curve for the IPO
from the small investor and allows him/her to receive allo-
cations and participate in the pricing, unlike the tradi-
tional method, in which only the institutional and pre-
ferred investors are involved. The final price of the IPO in
a Dutch auction is the lowest price at which all of the
shares are sold. The role of the investment bank as the
middleman is minimized. Proponents of the online auc-
tion process argue that the value of the IPO goes to the
company that is going public, rather than to the favored
clients of the investment bank. But, is the online auction
process likely to be the solution to the problem, or will it
generate additional problems?
The online auction process was developed in response
to the substantial increases between IPOs' offer prices
and their open prices at the peak of the dot-com era. Tbe
first online auction was in February' 1999 through
OpenIPO.com, which was developed by W.R.Hambrecht,
who had previously co-founded the investment bank
Hambrecht & Quist {San Jose Business Journal, P'ebruary
12, 1999). Table 1 indicates, however, that the average
offer-to-open price increase has dropped substantially
from the 55.4 percent-92.5 percent range during 1999-
2(X)1 into the 6.3 percent-8.6 percent range of 2002-
2004. This suggests that while the first day surges in an
example, the Wai! Street Journal. January H , 2005. noted that
the auction "methofl can sap the firsi (iuy price surges that IPOs typi-
cally enjoy;" while the Wall Street Jnurrml. January 10, 2(X)5. noted,
"With an aucliim. ihe price- is usually set afler aggregating l)i(ls and
deciding the highest price at which the company can sell its shares.
This often saps any firsl-day pops in price thai IPOs typically enjoy."
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Note: This table compares the average price increase between an il=O's offer price and
its open price and the average principal amount of an issue on a yeariy basis between
February, 1999 and June, 2005 across sii SiC codes and within Googie's four-digit SiC
code.
Source of undarlybig data: Thoms(»i Financial.
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Percentage of IPOs issued across 82% (247/303) 83% (152/184) 80% {95/119}
all SIC codes which had smaller
offer-to-open price increases
than Google
Percentage of IPOs issued in the 70% (14/20) 70% (7/10) 70% (7/10)
SIC 7370s that had smaller
offer-to-open price increases
than Google
Percentage of IPOs issued 60% (3/5) 50% (1/2) 66% (2/3)
in SIC 7375 that had smaller
offer-to-open price increases
than Google
Note: This table shows the percentage of tPOs that had smaller offet-to-open price increases than Google on their f rst day ot trading. The IPOs
Include new issues across all SIC codes, within Goc^te's three-digit SIC code, and within Google's four-digit SIC code. The IPOs are also divided into
new issues debuting during 2004, debuting prior to Google's debut (between January, 2004 and August 17, 2004), and debuting after Google's debut
(between August 19. 2004 and December 31. 2004).
SoMC« of undarlytne data: Thomson Rnancial.
IPO's pri(-e are important, one of the problems for which
the onhne auction mechanism was developed has less-
ened. A similar pattern of behavior is also evident in, for
example, the behavior of IPOs in Google's four-digit
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, which fotrus-
es on the Internet search sub-industry. With the exception
of 2(X)3 (during which only one IPO was issued in this
industry area), the magnitude of the offer-to-open price
increases has dampened relative to the 1999-2(MM) levels.
This gradual reduction in the magnitude of first day
price surges over time may be a reflection of more careful
pricing by some underwriters in the wake of substantial
litigation concerning their alleged manipulation of IPOs.
A second explanation may be that many of the technology
IPOs during the dol-eom iKxjm were in emerging indus-
tries, and—since most investors had a superfi<;ial under-
standing of the fundamentals and technology in these
industries—they had difficulty in accurately pricing the
issues and were influenced by "herd behavior."
Google: A Case Study in the Application of the
Online Auction Process
The performance of (i^oogle, which debuted using the
online auction process in August, 20()4, does not suggest
that the online au<;tion process served as an efficient pric-
ing mechanism since it did not minimize Google's first day
price surge. Google's offer price was $85, and it opened at
$100—reflecting an 18 percent increase. This increase
between the offer price
and the open price is
much greater than the
increase for typical
IPOs in 2(HH, as is evi-
dent in Table 2. Indeed,
82 percent of the IPOs
issued in 2()f)4 experi-
enced less of a jump
from the offer price to
the open price than
Google did, and the sta-
tistics were similar for
IPOs issued prior to




that of IPOs in its peer
group: about 70 percent
of the IPOs in its three-
digit Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) code
issued in 20()4 experienced less of an offer-to-open price
increase, and about 60 percent of the IPOs in Google's four-
digit SIC code—focusing largely on the Internet search
arena—exhibited less of an offer-to-open price increase.
Google's offer-to-open price increase of 18 percent far
exceeded the average of 8.6 percent for IPOs issued in all
SIC codes in 2004.
The enormous post-auction price increase of Google,
especially in the immediate weeks and months following
its debut, when there were few substantive news releases
on changes in company strategy and fundamentals, fur-
ther suggests that the online auction method may not have
priced (ioogle efficiently. Google subsequently soared in
the following months to a high of $317.80 on July 21,
2005. As of June 29, 2005, Google had exhibited price
appreciation of 186.8 percent, relative to its open price.
As is evident in Table 3, Google had more substantial
price appreciation than 97 percent of the IPOs issued in
2004 across all industries and SIC codes, than 90 percent
of the IPOs issued in its three-digit SIC industry area of
the 7370s, and than 80 percent of the IPOs issued in its
four-digit SIC code (7375). Table 4 shows that the average
subsequent price appreciation for all IPOs issued in 2(X)4
from their date of issue until June 29, 2(K)5 was 20.3 per-
cent. Subsequent price appreciation averaged 39.2 per-
cent for all IPOs issued in Google's broad industry area in
2004 and 90.1 percent for all IPOs in Google's Internet
search area in 2{X)4, all of whif'h are much lower than
Efficiency in IPO Issuance Economics • October 2005 57
C O M P A R I S O N OF S U B S E Q U E N T P R I C E A P P R E C I A T I O N R E L A T I V E TO
G O O G L E F O R P R E - G O O G L E A N D P O S T G O O G L E I P O S A C R O S S A L L S I C
C O D E S A N D W I T H I N G O O G L E S S I C C O D E S









100% (10/10) 80% (8/10)
Percentage of IPOs issued 97% (295/303) 96% (177/184) 99% (118/119)
across all SiC codes that had
smaller subsequent price
appreciation between their
issue date and June 29, 2005
than Google
Percentage of (POs issued 90% (18/20)
in the SIC 7370s that had
smaller subsequent price
appreciation between their
issue date and June 29, 2005
than Google
Percentage of IPOs issued in 80% (4/5)
SIC 7375 across all SIC codes
that had smaller subsequent
price appreciation between their
issue date and June 29. 2005
than Google
Nota: This table shows the percentage of IPOs that had less subsequent clce appreciation than Google Between their date of Issuance and June
29. 2005, The IPOs include new Issues across all SIC codes, within Google's three-digit SIC code, and within Google's four-digit SIC code. The IPOs
are also divided into new Issues debuting during 2004, debuting prior to Google's debut (between January, 2004 and August 17, 2004], and debut-
ing after Google's debut (between August 19, 2004 ami DeGamber 31,2004).
Source of undorfying data: Thomson Financial.
"• 100% (2/2) 66% (2/3)
A V E R A G E S U B S E Q U E N T P R I C E
A P P R E C I A T I O N F O R 2 0 0 4 I P O S A C R O S S S I C
C O D E S A N D W I T H I N G O O G L E S S I C C O D E
Average subsequent price appreciation from date 20.4%
of issue through June 29, 2005 for IPOs issued
in 2004 across all SIC codes „. ,,
Average subsequent price appreciation from date
of issue through June 29, 2005 for IPOs issued
in 2004 within Google's three-digit SIC code (the 7370s) 39.2%
Average subsequent price appreciation from date
of issue through June 29, 2005 for IPOs issued
in 2004 within Google's four-digit SIC code (7375) 90.1%
Source of underlying data: Thwnson Financial.
Google's 186.8 percent.
Critics of Google's IPO initially argued that the auc-
tion was a failure because Google slashed the number of
shares that it would sell at public auction from 25.7 mil-
lion to 19.6 million shares. Also, it dropped the target
price range from the $108-to-Sl35 range projected in late
July lo the $85-to-S95 price range (Knight Ridder, August
19, 2004). At the time, many analysts suggested that the
earlier Google price
range had been over-
priced; yet, Google's
closing price reached the
lower end of that price
range after 18 days of
trading and reached the
higher end of that price
range after 32 days of
trading.2 The lessening
interest in Google at the
time that it reduced the
price range during the
summer was possibly due
to some combination of
the following factors:
• the lack of information
provided by the <'om-
pany during the
process about its uses
of capital
• a slump in price appre-
ciation for June IPOs
• reservations on the
part of investors about
the use of the online
process.
It is possible that the
reduction in the price range may have made investors feel
as though Google were "on sale," and this greater desire to
purchase may have subsequently placed upward pressure
on the price, as did the subsequent aftermarket purchases
by hedge funds and institutional investors who had sat out
the auction process.
Who benefited from Google's price appreciation?
Under the traditional process, the preferred clients of the
undei-writing investment banks can benefit from the initial
IPO underpricing and subsequent price appreciation
since they have (he initial allocations. In the case of
Google, the beneficiaries in the price appreciation have
been: (1) those investors who bought Google when it first
began trading and held it until the price increased sub-
stantially and (2) the Google co-founders and the chief
executive, as well as the venture capital firm involved in
financing Google, who were allocated shares early in the
process, but who could not sell them until the "lock-up
period" expired. The Google co-founders and the chief
executive announced, at the end of November, their plans
p's closing price on Septemt)er 14. 2004, was $111.49. and its
price on October 4. 2(H)4. was $13.S.O6.
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to sell 16.6 million shares over the next 18 months. Tbe
lock-tjp period on 39 million Google shares expired in tbe
tbini week in November; and over tbe following three
months, tbe lock-up period expired on 227 million shares.
Tbe venture capital firm involved in financing Google—
Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers—tlistributed shares to
2(M) investors, including 20 institutions and individuals
who invested in its Fund IX-A, on the day that IPO
restrictions ended on sotTie oi its Google holdings (Wall
Street Journal. November 22, 2004). By July 2005, the
CEO Eric Schmidt and the company founders Sergey Brin
and Larry Page bad sold $1.7 billion in stock, other exec-
utives bad .sold more than $800 million in stock, and no
open market purchases bad been recorded. Indeed, Page
and Brin have sold 3.7 million and 3.8 million shares,
respectively, or roughly 400,000
shares per month, while Schmidt
bad sold 1.3 million shares, or
113,(XK) shares per tnonth, begin-
ning in November, 2004 {Wall
Street Journal, July 27, 2005).
Consequently, in tbe case of
Google, the mispricing of its initial
offer price at $85 in the online auc-
tion bad a positive externality tbat
indirectly benefited tbe company.
Traditionally, an offer price tbat is
set too low represents "money left
on tbe table" for tbe issuing com-
pany, since the higher subsequent
prices could have been reflected in
tbe initial offer price. Neverthe-
less, since tbe Google co-founders,
CEO, and venture capital investors
beld such a substantial number of
shares, they were able to indirectly
protect the company from tbe mis-
pri( ing, since they financially ben-
efited from tbe mispricing by sell-
ing their shares at a high price,
wbicb could enrich tbe company to
tbe degree that these profits are
plowed back.
Google's substantial price
appreciation following its August,
2004 debut stimulated a resur-
gence of interest in tbe IPO market
which, at least in the short teim,
contributed to price appreciation
for hotb new and seasoned equity
issues. Indeed, by tbe tbird week of
October, tbe Nasdaq index bad risen ten percent after
Google's debut, after having declined seven percent over
tbe previous two months. EBay, Askjeeves, and Yahoo all
experienced price gains exceeding 20 percetit between
Google's IPO in mid-August and the third week in
October {Knight Ridder, October 23, 2004).
Although tbe debut of Google caught tbe attention of
tbe media and consumers, it did not stimulate a torrent of
new issues, either across SIC codes or witbin its broader
industry area. As Table 5 indicates, 184 IPOs were issued
in the 7.5 months prior to Google's debut and 174 IPOs
were issued in the following six months. Similarly, witbin
Google's three-digit SIC industry area, ten IPOs were
issued in tbe 7.5 months prior to Google's debut and 13
IPOs in the subsequent 7.5 months. Witbin Google's spe-
S T A T I S T I C S ON 2 0 0 4 I P O S
TABLE 5
I S S U E D PRE G OOGLE AND POST-
G O O G L E A C R O S S A L L S I C C O D E S A N D W I T H I N G O O G L E S
C O D E
ALL SIC CODES
Pre Google Average: January, 2004 to
mid-August, 2004 (7.5 months)
Post Google Average: mid-August, 2004
to March, 2005 (7.5 months)
Post Google Average: August, 2004
to December, 2004
Post Google Average: August, 2004
to June, 2005
ALL StC 7370S
Pre Google Average: January, 2004
to mid August, 2004 (7.5 months}
Post Google Average: mid-August, 2004)
to March, 2005 (7.5 months
Post Google Average: August, 2004
to December, 2004
Post Google Average: August, 2004
to June, 2005
SIC 7375 fGOOGLE'S SIC CODE)
Pre Google Average: January, 2004
to mid-August, 2004 (7.5 months)
Post Google Average: mid-August, 2004
to March, 2005 (7.5 months)
Post Google Average: August, 2004
to December, 2004














































Noto: This table comcares the average price increase between the otter price and the opeh prica tor ah IPO and the average princi-
pal amount of the Issue before Google's IPO and after Google's IPO across all SIC codes, withlh Google's three-digit SIC code, and
within Google's tour-dlgit SIC code.
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cific SIC industr)' area, two IPOs were issued in tbe 7.5
months prior to Google's debut and three IPOs were
issued in the following 7.5 months (they were actually
issued prior to the end of December, 2004).
One of the flaws of the online
process is that the small investor,
who is supposed to he a primary
participant in this auction, may
lack access to sufficiently detailed
information.
Thus, the most significant legacy of Google's IPO bas
been that it has focused the attention of the public on
online auctions as an alternative issuance process. As
more IPOs are issued online, the strengths and weakness-
es of the process may become even more apparent.
Indeed, according to Thomson Financial, auction IPOs—
including Google's IPO—raised four percent of all assets
generated by IPOs in 2004; whereas, over the past five
years, IPOs through the auction process only generated
about 0.15 percent of all assets raised through IPOs {Wall
Street Journal, January 11, 2005).
Causes of and Solutions to Problems in the
Online Auction Process
One of the ilaws ol the online process is that the small
investor, who is supposed to be a primary participant in
this auction, may lack access to sufficiently detailed infor-
mation sources to appropriately price tbe security on the
basis of its fundamentals. This problem is compounded by
the lack of information that the online process (in contrast
to the traditional IPO process) requires to be disclosed in
the absence of the traditional bookbuilding process.
Indeed, one of the criticisms of Google throughout the
process was that it was "secretive" in how it would use ils
funds and conveyed little detailed information in its brief-
ing at the Waldoif-Astoria Hotel in New York [Wall Street
Journal, August 19,2004).
At the time, Google faced several strategic issues,
which, in the absence of more detailed infonnation on the
uses of the capital to be raised, may have been difficult for
the smaller investors to evaluate. These included Google's
lack of diversification in revenue sources and reliance on
online advertising, rather than on the other suhscrription-
based services (unlike Yahoo and Microsoft). Fortunately,
despite Google's unforthcoming stance in providing infor-
mation, it entered into a series of moves in the summer of
2{K)5 that contributed to greater diversification, such as
the introduction of software tools for Windows, including
Google Desktop Search and Google Talk, and an expan-
sion of Gmail, Google's web-based e-mail service, to all
users {Neiv York Times, August 24 and 25, 2005).
Google's secrecy has continued with its announce-
ment in mid-August, 2005 that it would issue 14.8 million
new shares through a second stock sale, which could raise
more than $4 billion. Although Google noted in its filing
to the SEC that it would use the proceeds for "working
capital and capital expenditures, and possible acquisi-
tions," it did not specify greater detail (Los Angeles Times,
August 19, 2005), and that led to a flurry of suggestions
that it needed the capital to expand into Asia (like Yahoo
has done) or acquire an Internet phone company to
expand into the VOIP arena {Wall Street Journal, August
19, 2005 and Washington Post, August 19, 2005).
Fortunately, despite the lack of external transparency in
Google's strategic processes, it has surpassed analysts'
earnings expectations. Nevertheless, the lack of informa-
tion required by underwriters and the financial markets in
the online auction process can be problematic for less
successful companies, inasmuch as the online process
could be used by companies that may not have a clear
sense of the uses for the funds that they are raising.
A second potential flaw of the online process is that,
due to the less rigorous scrutiny by investment banks and
the consequent reduction in information provided by the
issuing firm, well-known firms that would have had diffi-
culty in going publi(- using the traditional IPO process
may be more likely to use the online auction mechanism.
The circumstances suiTounding Momingstar's decision in
January 2005 to use the IPO auction process as its vehi-
cle are consistent with this theory. Skeptics of
Momingstar's decision have argued that Morningstar
chose the online auction mechanism because it was not
confident about its prospects for going public using the
traditional IPO issuance process. Indeed, its IPO filing
under the traditional process had been dormant since May
2004, and Morningstar has been the subject of several
enquiries. In September 2004, Morningstar was the sub-
ject of an SEC investigation concerning inaccurate data
that had been on its website. In December 2004, Eliot
Spitzer, as well as the SEC, began looking into possible
conflic t^s of interest from Morningstar Associates' recom-
mendations to 401(k) on mutual fund investment options,
while Morningstar itself provides fund ratings {Wall Street
Journal, JanuaiT 11, 2005). Indeed, Morgan Stanley exec-
utives warned Morningstar thai "an auction carried a high
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risk of an 'adverse 00100016,'" auch that when Mominfi;star
continued with the auction, instead of switching lo the tra-
ditional process. Morgan Stanley resigned a.s the lead
underwriter (Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2005).
Despite the gloomy prognosis, Morningstar rose 8.4
percent on its first day of trading, although opponents of
the auction argued that the auction price was set sufli-
ciently low so that it would rise once trading began
because tbe winning bidders only received 65 percent of
the number of shares for which they had hid. This prac-
tice, they argued, was similar to the behavior of large,
underwriters in the traditional IPO process {Wall Street
Journal, July 6, 2{K)5).
In conclusion, although the Mortiingstar auction was
successful, Moruiugstar may not have been as successful
if it had undergone the traditional process, since the
greater scrutiny of underwriters in the bookhuiltling
process may have raised additional questions, whereas
the stnall investors, whom the auction theoretically target-
ed, may have been more likely to focus on Momingstar's
name recognition.
The recent SEC proposals to modify the "quiet peri-
od" may provide a solution to the possible informational
problems inherent in the online auction process. During
the "quiet period," companies traditionally have been
only allowed to give out infomiation orally (in presenta-
tions), but not in written form (except for the company's
prospectus). The "quiet period" provided an information-
al advantage to the institutional investors, since small
investors are less likely to be able to attend company pre-
sentations. The greater involvement of the small investors
in pri< ing in online auctions <'ouhl have further exagger-
ated the impact of this informational asymmetry in the
online process relative to the traditional process
In late October 2004, the SEC voted to liberalize
these niles by allowing companies planning an IPO to
communicate information to investors verbally or iti writ-
ing, provided that this information would be filed with tbe
SEC {Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2004).
Indeed, the St^C has also proposed to allow the mar-
keting "roadshows" of IPOs to be broadcast otiline to all
investors, although this wouM not be a requirement {Wall
Street Journal, January 3, 2005).
Smaller and less well-known companies, previously
handicapped by their inability to use the media and the
Web during the "quiet period" to generate interest, are
more likely to stimulate investor enthusiasm in tbeir IPO
{Investment Dealers Digest, October 18, 2(K)4). The inftn-
mational problem may be minimized by issuing compa-
nies providing more infomiation on: (1) the uses for the
capital that they are raising; (2) their strategies for over-
coming potential challenges; (3) the corporate governance
mechanisms within the firm (share of outsiders on the
hoard, etc.); (4) their reasons for using the online auction
process, rather than the traditional process; and (5) their
involvement in any current or potential litigation.
A Broader Comparison of IPO Allocation
Processes
In more broadly evaluating the performance of the
online auction IPO process beyond the case of Google's
IPO, it is helpful to compare O[)en IPO.com's auction per-
formance with the average performance of IPOs issued
over the past six years by various primary' lead underwrit-
ers. Data were compiled from Thomson Financial on each
IPO for which a given firm served as the primary lead
underwriter. Then the average offer-to-open percentage
price increase was calculated for each underwriter over
all of the IPOs for which they served as the primar}' lead
underwriter between Februaiy 1999 and June 2005.
Figure 1 shows the number of underwriters whose average
offer-to-open percentage price increase fell into a given
range. Over this period., WR Hanibrecht's OpenIPO.com
auction exhibited an average offer-to-open percentage
price increase of 29 percent. Figure 1 indicates that the
average offer-to-open price increase for IPOs issued by
online auction equaled or exceeded the offer-to-open
increase for 82.4 percent of the primary lead underwriters
(108 out of 131).^This reinforces the hypothesis, suggest-
ed by Google's behavior, that the online auction mecha-
nism does not minimize the first day price surge.
Figure 1, however, does not tell the entire story.
Figure 2 shows the average number of IPOs for each
undei-writer whose average offer-to-open percentage price
increase falls into a given range. Many of the underwriters
that exhibit p<K)rer perfomiance than online auctions (as
measured by a higher average offer-to-open percentage
price increase) are high volume issuers. Figure 3 shows
the average value per IPO per underwriter for each under-
writer whose average offer-to-open percentage price
increase falls in a given range. Again, many of the under-
writers with poorer performance than the online auctions
have high average values per IPO.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence to date, it appears
that online auctions have a better performance (lower
average offer-to-open price increases) than the perform-
ance of the traditional process for medium to high volume
underwriters, and a worse performance (higher average
offer-to-open price increases) than the traditional process
for low volume underwriters. Table 6 segments the sample
data may be obtained from the author at ndheiiset@np.s.edii.
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to include all undei'writers, underwriters that seiTed as
primary' lead underwriter on less than 14 IPOs ("low vol-
ume underwriters"), underwriters that served as primary
lead underwriter for over 14 IPOs between 1999 and 2005
("niedium-to-high volume underwriters"), and underwrit-
ers that served as prinian' lead underwriter for over 40
IPOs ("high volume underwriters").
The first column contains the average offer-to-open
percentage price increase for all undei'writers (excluding
OpenIPO.com) over the past five years. OpenlPO.com's
online auction average offer-to-open price increase of 29
percent is higher than the average for all undenvriters,
which suggests that auctions have been less efficient than
traditional processes. However, when the sample is bro-
ken down into low volume, medium-to-high volume, and
high volume undei'writers, the data suggest that the online
auction mechanism has been more efficient than the tra-
ditional process for medium to high volume and high vol-
ume underwriters but less efficient than the traditional
process for low volume underwriters.
The second column in Table 6 calculates a weighted
average offer—to-open price increase across all underwriters
by weighting the average offer-to-open price increase for
each underwriter by the total number of IPOs for each
underwriter. Unlike the results of the unweighted average
offer-to-open price increase across all underwriters (17.65
percent), when the firsl day price surges are weighted by
the total number of IPOs for each undei'writer, the larger
offer-to-open price
increases of the medi-
um and high volume
underwriters dominate,




is higher than the
online auction's aver-
age first day price
surge of 29 percent.
However, once again,
the online auction is
not as efficient as
underwriting by low-
volume underwriters.




by using the total aver-
age value of IPOs for
each underwriter as the weights. The results of this weighted
average by value reinforce the results of the weiglited aver-
age by volume: the online auction mechanism has been more
efficient than traditional processes for medium and high vol-
ume unden\ritei-s. but less efficient than traditional process-
es for lower volume underwriters.^
Table 7 compares the performance of individual IPOs
issued by the online auction pn>cess with comparable IPOs
issued by the traditional process in the same industry, as
measured by the Standard Industi^ Classification (SIC)
code. A total of four of the nine IPOs (44 percent) issued by
the online auction process had greater offer-to-open price
increases than comparable IPOs issued using the tradition-
al process in the same yeai" and in the same three-digit SIC
"^Nevertheless, while some high volume underwriters had larger aver-
age {)Uer-tC)-apen pereentage priee iiiereases than OpentPO.corn's auc-
tions, there are also some high volume issuers ihat have lower average
uffer-to-apen perc-entage price increases than the auctions. For exam-
ple, those thai had higher average offer-to-(ipen percentage price
increases for the tPOs for which ihey served as primary lead under-
writer include Morgan Stanley (168 percent acn)ss 119 IPOs), Gnldman
Sachs (62 percent across 1,% tPOs). BancBoslon Roliertson Stephens
(94 percent across 46 IPOs). Donaldson. Liiikin. and Jenrelte (45 per-
cenl across 53 IPOs), and Deutsche Bank (42 percent across 47 IPOs).
Ijirge volume underwriters whose average oKer-to-open percentage
price increase were lower than auctions include Bear Sleanis (26 per-
cent across 49 IPOs). CSFB (22 percent increase acn)ss 93 IPOs),
Citigroup (4 percent across I t 3 IPt)s), Merrill Lynch (20 percent
across 179 IPOs), and I^ehman Brothers (27 jiercent across 86 IPOs).
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by the totai number





by the total average

















Medium to high volume
issuers: All underwriters
that served as primary
underwriter for over 14 IPOs
between 1999 and 2005
High volume issuers: 42.85%
All underwriters that served
as primary underwriter for
over 40 IPOs between
1999 and 2005
" Calculated as the average across underwriters of the average offer-to^3f>en percentage price irKfease for each underwriter (or all IPOs between
February 1999 and June 2005 for which they served as the primary bookrunnner.
* • Calculated by multiplying the average offer-tcKipen price increase for each underwriter by the total number of IPOs that the given underwriter
Issued between Fet>njafy 1999 and June 2005, summing, and then dividing by the total number of IPOs issued by all underwriters during tfw peri-
od.
***Calculatedby multiplying the average otfer-toopen price increase for each underwriter by the total numberof IPOs issued by the given under-
writef over the period multiplied by the average value per IPO per underwriter, summing, and then dividing by the product of the total number of
IPOs per underwriter ana average value per IPO per underwriter summed across all underwriters.





code.'"' This suggests ihal the online auction mechanism is
not as eifi(-ient in minimizing the first day price surge as
some have thought.
The data in Table 7 further indicate that the process
is inefficient in pricing in that the subsequent price
appreciation from ihe first day of trading for the IPO until
June 29, 2005 is significantly higher for IPOs that debut
using the online auction process relative to comparable
IPOs debuting in the same year and industry area using
the traditional method. A total of eight of the nine IPOs
(89 percent) that debuted online exhibited more substan-
tial subsequent price appreciation than comparable IPOs
issued using the traditional process in the same year and
in the same three-digit SIC code.
•""Talile 7 includes only nine mil of llie 14 IPOs that delmled using the
online aucliim pnn-ess, since tlie other five did nol have comparable
IPOs issued in the same year in the same three-digit StC industry area.
Conclusion
The advantages of the
online auction process
must be weighed against
its disadvantages. On the
one hand, it increases the
ability of small investors




investors, who are lucra-
tive clients of underwrit-
ing investment banks. On
the other han(l, small
investors may lack the
ability to efficiently price




investors lack access to
the sources that institu-
tional investors have or
because companies are
not required to provide
detai led information i n
the online process, since
they don't undergo the
rigorous sc-rutiny of
investment banks in the
traditional b(H>kbuildIng process. As a result, the online
process could be used more by companies that may not
have a clear sense of the uses for the funds that they are
raising or by well-known companies that may not have been
successful in the traditional issuance pro-cess. However,
investors could have tliffit-ulty in distinguishing successful
companies from "lemons" and, consequently could end up
discounting the price of all online IPOs due to this poten-
tial adverse selection problem.
Use of the online auction process certainly provided
publicity for Google's IPO, which may have stimulated the
interest of small investors and others who are normally less
involves! in the pr<K:ess. It is unlikely, however, that the use
of the online auction would generate such extensive public-
ity for a less well-known IPO. Indeed, the pubhc may be
exceptionally wary of a less well-known company that uses
the online auction method to issue its IPO because of the
lack of detailed information provided by the issuer in this
pnx-ess, relative to the traditional process.
One of the principal advantages of the online auction
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TABLE
C O M P A R A T i V E S T A T I S T I C S ON A U C T I O N i P O S A N D














CODE I S S U E D iN THE SAME
Issuer
Auction IPO: Ravenswood Winery
Comparable Traditional IPO;
Pepsi Bottling Group





Average of traditional IPOs
in 2004 for SIC 2830s
Auction IPO: Genitope Corp
Average of traditional
IPOs in 2003 for SIC 2830s
Auction IPO: Nogatech, Inc.
Average of traditional IPOs
in 2000 for SIC 3670s
Auction IPO: Briazz, Inc.
Average of traditional IPOs
in 2001 for SIC 5810s
Auction IPO:
Sunset Financial Resources, Inc.
Average of traditional IPOs
in 2004 for SIC 6790s
Auction IPO: Salon.com
Auction IPO: Andovennet Inc
Average of traditional IPOs
in 1999 for SIC 7370s
Auction IPO: Google
Average of traditional IPOs
in 2004 for SIC 73755
Average of traditional IPOs


























































































Ttethod in the same year and in the same three-digit SIC code.
Note that this table does not include the following OpenlPO IPOs because there were no other comparable traditional IPOs in their three^ligit SIC code in the year of issue: RedEnveiope, Inc.,
Owerstocl^ .com, Morntngstar, Bor Holding, inc.
Source of orlglnBl underlying data: Thomson Financial. Source of listing of WR Hambrechl's auction IPOs: (htt p://www. wrhamb recht .com).
process is supposed to be that the increase between the
offer price and the open pri<'e of an IPO is minimized,
whi<'h provides the issuer with greater value. Nevertheless,
the onhne auction method for Google did not minimize its
first day price surge, since 82 percent of the IPOs issued
in 20()4 usinp; the traditional IPO process experienced less
of a price surge. A l>roader comparison of the pricing
behavior of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs by primary
lead underwriter indicates that although the average offer-
to-open price surges for the OpenlPO.com online auction
IPOs exceed the average offer-to-open price surges for
IPOs issued by 82.4 percent of the primary lead under-
writers, the auction process was, on average, more efficient
in pricing IPOs than the traditional process for medium-to-
high volume issuers, and less efficient than the traditional
process for low volume issuers. A (omparison of auction
IPOs with traditional IPOs issued in the same year and in
the same three-digit SIC code suggests that 44 percent of
the auction IPOs have greater offer-lo-open price surges
than their traditional counterparts, and that 89 percent of
the online IPOs exhibited more substantial subsequent
price appreciation than their traditional counterparts. This
suggests that the online auction mechanism is not as effi-
cient in pricing IPOs as some have thought.
On the other hand, the traditional process leaves
much to be desired. With the recent Spitzer probes into a
variety of common business practices—ranging from "bid
rigging" in the insurance industiy to market timing and
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late trading in the mutual fund industry—the general con-
fidence of the public in traditional processes in the finan-
cial markets may be at a low ebb, making this an excellent
time to develop new methods of IPO issuance. However,
the newer methods will also have liabilities. With interest in
[POs rebounding and the growing belief of small investors
that they can become involved early with new issues, it is
likely that some of the weaknesses of the online auction may
be improved. Issuing companies can partially alleviate the
weaknesses by providing investors with sufficiently detailed
infoiTnation that good companies can be distinguished from
lemons, so that the adverse selection problems can be min-
imized. The SEC reforms on the "quiet period" are the first
step in eliminating informational asymmetry. Further
requirements in the online process for detailed information
from the issuer and greater involvement of all parties in the
process are likely to lead to a more egalitarian and trans-
parent process for providing new companies with capital. •
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In Susan Sterne's article, "Il's All About Wealth," in the July 2005 issue, the heading on Figure 5 was incorrect.
The correct figure should be:
T W O D I F F E R E N T S A V I N G S R A T E S
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This correction has already been made in the article on www.nabe.com.
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